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Coming in January 2003: Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal
Special Symposium Edition
"Australia's Tampa Incident: The Convergence of
International and Domestic Refugee and Maritime Law in the
Pacific Rim"
The "Tampa Incident" refers to the events surrounding Australia's
refusal to accept more than four hundred Afghan and Iraqi asylum seekers
who were rescued from a sinking Indonesian ferry by a Norwegian freighter
(the M/V Tampa) on August 26, 2001. Ultimately, after an eight-day
standoff in which multiple states, the United Nations, and international
organizations weighed in, the asylum seekers were transferred to the island
nation of Nauru for refugee claim processing.
Following the Tampa Incident, Australia instituted retroactive
legislation to establish mandatory sentencing for people smugglers,
restrictions on the legal rights of refugees, a new temporary visa system for
"illegal" migrants who arrive without legal visas, and the excision of
external territories from Australia's migration zones.
Australia's response to the Tampa Incident may contravene the
obligations, as well as the spirit, of the international treaties established for
refugee protection. Australia's strong reluctance to allow vessels bearing
illegal migrants to enter its territorial waters may also violate international
maritime treaties. Thus, the Tampa incident is a catalyst for formulating and
evaluating comprehensive plans in accordance with international law and
customary norms to prevent protracted ad hoc decisions and alleviate the
burdens placed on the Good Samaritan shipmaster.
In April 2002, the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal will host an
international symposium, "Australia's Tampa Incident: The Convergence of
International and Domestic Refugee and Maritime Law in the Pacific Rim."
Following the symposium, the Journal will publish a Special Edition, which
will feature articles by scholars and practitioners participating in the
symposium.
In anticipation of the symposium, we are pleased to publish two
student comments addressing the Tampa Incident: Emily C. Peyser,
"Pacific Solution"? The Sinking Right to Seek Asylum in Australia; and
Jessica E. Tauman, Rescued at Sea, But Nowhere to Go: The Cloudy Legal
Waters of the Tampa Crisis.
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"PACIFIC SOLUTION"? THE SINKING RIGHT TO SEEK
ASYLUM IN AUSTRALIA
Emily C. Peysert
Abstract: On August 26, 2001, Australia attracted worldwide media attention by
refusing entry to over 430 Afghan and Iraqi asylum seekers who were rescued at sea by a
Norwegian freighter. Australia's Parliament subsequently passed legislation to heighten
already strict migration laws pertaining to boat migrants. Even though Australia is party
to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, recent
developments in national asylum policies retreat from the legal obligations, as well as the
spirit, of these international treaties. Australia, however, is not the only country acting to
deter boat migrants; the United States, for example, has also employed a high seas
interdiction program to repel unwanted boat migrants since the 1980s.
To understand why Australia has made substantial changes to its migration laws,
this Comment explores the shift in migration patterns in recent years that have induced
States Parties to the Refugee Convention to tighten refugee provisions. This Comment
further proposes that Australia's response-which includes disproportionate penalties for
those who arrive by boat, and coercion of developing countries, such as Nauru and Papua
New Guinea, to act as asylum processing sites-is not a sustainable or economically
feasible legal policy. Australia's response serves as a catalyst for evaluating the
challenges contemporary policy-makers face in reconciling the ideals of the 1951
Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol with current migration issues.
I. AUSTRALIA'S TAMPA ASYLUM SEEKER CRISIS
On August 26, 2001, when a crippled Indonesian ferry was sighted
foundering in the Indian Ocean, Australian immigration officials announced
that the biggest boatload of asylum seekers' ever to attempt to reach
Australian shores was on its way.2  Fortunately, over 430 Afghan and Iraqi
t The author wishes to thank Professor Joan Fitzpatrick, Professor Veronica Taylor, Carmel
Morgan, and Denise Lietz, who offered invaluable advice and encouragement.
This Comment generally uses the term "asylum seekers" for persons who are outside their country
of origin and are seeking access to asylum processing at or within the borders of an asylum state, and the
term "refugees" for persons who have been processed, whether in-country or overseas, and have been
granted protection by the asylum state. Different legal terms, however, may be used to describe the same
status in different countries. Under U.S. law, for example, refugee status is only available to persons
applying from outside U.S. borders. Asylum status, in contrast, is available to persons seeking protection
within U.S. borders. DEBORAH ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNrTED STATES 4 (3d ed. 1999). Under
Australian law, "protection visas" are granted to those to whom Australia has protection obligations.
Hossein Esmaeili & Belinda Wells, The 'Temporary' Refugees: Australia's Legal Response to the Arrival
of Iraqi and Afghan Boat-People, 23(3) U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 224, 228 (2000) (quoting Migration Act,
1958 (Austi.) [hereinafter Migration Act] § 36(2)).
2 Nick Taylor, Island Braces for Biggest Refugee Wave, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Aug. 26, 2001,
LEXIS, News Library, Australia Publications.
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migrants were rescued by the M/V Tampa, a Norwegian freighter, and taken
to waters off Christmas Island.3 When the Tampa entered Australian waters
seeking assistance, Prime Minister John Howard ordered the Australian
Defense Force to seize control of the Norwegian vessel and hold the
migrants on board4 in order to keep them from setting foot on Australian soil
and trying to claim asylum. Five days later, Howard ordered the migrants
transferred onto the HMAS Manoora, bound for the island-state of Nauru,
for distant asylum processing. 5 This was the beginning of what Australia
calls its "Pacific Solution."6
On September 8, the Australian navy intercepted and boarded a
second Indonesian boat with 237 migrants, again Afghans and Iraqis, en
route to Australia's Ashmore Reef.7 This second group of asylum seekers
was disembarked from the Indonesian boat onto the Manoora, joining the
first group. Although the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
("UNHCR") implored the Australia Government to grant the Tampa asylum
seekers access to its national asylum determination procedure, it refused, and
3 Vardarlis v. Ruddock, 64 A.L.D. 67 (Sept. 11, 2001), overruled by Ruddock v. Vardarlis, 183
A.L.R. 1 (Sept. 18, 2001); 434 Boat People Rescued From Crippled Indonesian Ferry, AAP NEWSFEED,
Aug. 27, 2001, LEXIS, News Library, Australia Publications. Australia's Christmas Island is more than
900 miles from the mainland of Australia, but only 210 miles south of Indonesia's Java. Jana Mason,
Paying the Price: Australia, Indonesia Join Forces to Stop "Irregular Migration" ofAsylum Seekers, 22(8)
REFUGEE REPORTS 1, 2 (Aug.-Sept. 2001). For an in-depth discussion of the international maritime law
implications of this incident, see Jessica Tauman, Comment, Rescued at Sea, But Nowhere to Go: The
Cloudy Legal Waters of the Tampa Crisis, 11 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 461 (2002).
4 Vardarlis v. Ruddock, 64 A.L.D. 67 (Sept. 11,2001), overruled by Ruddock v. Vardarlis, 183
A.L.tL 1 (Sept. 18, 2001).
5 See Mason, supra note 3, at 9-10. Although the HMAS Manoora was originally bound for Papua
New Guinea, where the asylum seekers would be transferred to Nauru and New Zealand, the Manoora was
later ordered to bypass Papua New Guinea and proceed directly to Nauru. Id. The tiny South Pacific island
of Nauru, twenty-one square kilometers with a population of 12,000, became an independent republic in
1968. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Nauru, at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/nr.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2002). The island was
depleted of its phosphate-rich soil by a German-British mining consortium in the early 20th century and
occupied by Australian forces during World War I. Id.
6 This new distant asylum processing system is what Australia calls its "Pacific Solution"; it entails
intercepting boats bound for Australia and transporting boat people to various Pacific Islands. No Shame in
Putting National Interest First, AUSTRALIAN, Jan. 28, 2002, LEXIS, News Library. Nauru agreed to house
1200 asylum seekers for application processing in return for education, health, and infrastructure aid as
well as other incentives from Australia worth AUD 30 million total. Robert Garran & Megan Saunders,
Nauru Rescues PM Again, AUSTRALIAN, Dec. 12, 2001, LEXIS, News Library. Papua New Guinea
accepted 216 Pacific Solution asylum seekers in return for AUD 20 million from the Australian
Government. Id. In addition, New Zealand accepted 131 asylum seekers. Natalie O'Brien et al., Ring of
Miser Around Region, AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 25, 2001, LEXIS, News Library.
Refugees Showdown, SUNDAY AGE, Sept. 9, 2001, LEXIS, News Library, Major World
Newspapers. Australia's Ashmore Reef is 192 miles from the mainland, but only 90 miles south of the
Indonesian island of Roti, near West Timor. Mason, supra note 3, at 2.8 Refugees Showdown, supra note 7.
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the last of the asylum seekers to board the Manoora was offloaded at the
island of Nauru on October 4.9
Immediately following the Tampa incident, and in a further attempt to
deter the great influx of boat people, the Australian Parliament passed
retroactive border control legislation to institute mandatory sentencing for
people smugglers, restrict the legal rights of refugees, establish a new
temporary visa system for "illegal" migrants, 10 and excise external
territories-including Christmas Island and Ashmore Reef-from
Australia's migration zones." In effect, asylum seekers who land-or have
landed-on Australia's territorial islands may be transported to distant
processing sites, and asylum seekers who pass through another "safe
country,"' 12 where they could have stayed without fear of persecution, may
only apply for temporary visas.'
3
After the inception of Australia's new deterrence scheme, worldwide
media attention exposed the plight of desperate boat people from "hot-spot"
countries Afghanistan and Iraq.14  A third group of 262 Afghan and Iraqi
asylum seekers was taken from Ashmore Reef on October 1 to Nauru aboard
9 Sian Powell & Megan Saunders, Iraqis Forced OffManoora, AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 2, 2001, LEXIS,
News Library. After a two-week refusal to disembark at Nauru, the last six asylum seekers were escorted
off the HMAS Manoora by Australian soldiers in full battle dress and taken ashore. Id.
10 Asylum seekers who arrive in Australia without applying for refugee status from outside or whilst
in possession of valid travel documents are referred to as "illegal" migrants. See Esmaeili & Wells, supra
note 1, at 224-25.
11 Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act, 2001 (Austl.); Migration
Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act, 2001 (Austl.); Migration Amendment (Excision from
Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Act, 2001 (Austl.); Migration Legislation Amendment Act,
No. 1, 2001 (Austl.); Migration Legislation Amendment Act, No. 5, 2001 (Austl.); Migration Legislation
Amendment Act, No. 6, 2001 (Austl.); and, Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act, 2001
(Austl.). Australian statutes are available at the Australian Attorney-General's Department legal
information retrieval system, SCALEplus, http://scaleplus.law.gov.au (last visited Mar. 9, 2002). For a
description of important provisions of these acts, see infra Part IV.C.
I A "safe country" is defined as "a country that has an asylum process that meets international
standards and is not itself a source of asylum seekers." Julie Mertus, The State and the Post-Cold War
Refugee Regime: New Models, New Questions, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 59, 78 (1998) (citing Charles B.
Keeley & Sharon Stanton Russell, Responses of Industrialized Countries to Asylum Seekers, 47 J. INT'L
AFF. 399, 405 (1994); Alberto Achermann & Mario Gattikere, Safe Third Countries: European
Developments, 7 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 19 (1995); Eva Kjaergaard, The Concept of "Safe Third Country" in
Contemporary European Refugee Law, 6 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 649, 650-51 (1994)). Movement from a
country of first asylum is sometimes described as "irregular" if no threat to the asylum seeker's physical
safety or freedom existed in that first country. Refugee Protection and Migration Control: Perspectives
from UNHCR and IOM, Global Consultations on Int'l Protection, 2d mtg., Doe. No. EC/GC/01/I 1, at 9
(May 31,2001), at http://www.unhcr.ch [hereinafter Refugee Protection].
13 Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Act, 2001
(Austl.); see infra Part IV.C.
14 For a discussion of country conditions in Afghanistan and Iraq, see infra Part IV.B.2.
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the HMAS Tobruk, finally disembarking on October 15.15 When a fourth
boatload of Iraqis was forcibly turned back toward Indonesia by the HMAS
Adelaide on October 6, the asylum seekers jumped overboard, allegedly
threw children overboard,' 6 and sabotaged the boat, forcing the navy frigate
to rescue them and take them to Christmas Island.' 7  A fifth boat that
departed from Indonesia on October 10 was allegedly hijacked by 170
Australia-bound asylum seekers and was found drifting in Indonesia's
eastern archipelago a few weeks later.18 Then, tragically, on October 19, an
overcrowded sixth boat carrying nearly 400 asylum seekers foundered in the
rough seas of the Sunda Strait, between the Indonesian islands of Java and
Sumatra.1 9 Only forty-five of its passengers were rescued, leaving over 350
drowned. 20  At least thirty of the people on board had been classified as
genuine refugees by the UNHCR in Indonesia, but frustrated by resettlement
delays, had left to try to claim asylum yet again in Australia. Thus, boat
15 Sian Powell, Nauru Baulks at a Third Batch of Asylum Seekers, AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 1, 2001,
LEXIS, News Library; Robert Green, Tobruk Delivers Its Human Cargo to Nauru, AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 16,
2001, LEXIS, News Library.
16 Boat People Sabotage Their Vessel, AAP NEWSFEED, Oct. 8, 2001, LEXIS, News Library.
Australian Defense Minister Peter Reith refused to publicly release a video that allegedly proved asylum
seekers threw children overboard in an effort to put the Australian Government under duress. Robert
Garran, Reith Video Not Coming to a Screen Near You, THE WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 27, 2001,
LEXIS, News Library. However, other reports of October 10-11 did not depict children being thrown
overboard. Steve Lewis et al., Costello Forced to Find $400M as Refugee Costs Spiral, AUSTRALIAN
FINANCIAL REv., Feb. 14, 2002, LEXIS, News Library. See also Vanda Carson & Natalie O'Brien,
Children Swam for Their Lives: Witness, AUSTRALIAN, Nov. 9, 2001, LEXIS, News Library.
17 Boat People Sabotage Their Vessel, supra note 16. The 223 asylum seekers who were picked up
by the HMAS Adelaide were housed on Christmas Island in a corrugated iron hall with no access to radio
or television and no contact with island residents. Megan Saunders & Natalie O'Brien, Deal with PNG to
Take Boat People, AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 12, 2001, LEXIS, News Library. Australia negotiated with Papua
New Guinea to house these asylum seekers. Id.; Garran & Saunders, supra note 6.
18 Don Greenless, 'Hijacked' Refugees Found OffIndonesia, AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 29, 2001, LEXIS,
News Library. A crewman was found floating at sea after he had jumped overboard to escape. Id. This
boat was later repaired in Indonesia and allegedly sighted continuing its journey to Australia. Don
Greenless, 'Hijack' Boat Heading this Way Again, AUSTRALIAN, Nov. 2, 2001, LEXIS, News Library
[hereinafter Boat Heading this Way].
19 Megan Saunders, Blame-and-Claim Game Trails a Human Tragedy, WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN, Oct.
27, 2001, LEXIS, News Library.
20 Id. Other boats journeying from Indonesia to Australia may also have gone down, including one
with 247 people on board. See Don Greenless & Megan Saunders, Forced on to Death Boat-Gun-Toting
Securit Officers Ordered Asylum Seekers to Sail, AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 25, 2001, LEXIS, News Library.
2 The husband of one of the refugees lost in the tragic sinking on October 19 admitted that most of
the people on the boat had been waiting for years to obtain a visa; they resorted to the people-smuggling
network because they had no other hope from the Australian Government of reunion with their families in
Australia. Penny Brown & Claire Harvey, Muslims Say PM to Blame for Tragedy, AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 26,
2001, LEXIS, News Library. Of the over 350 who drowned, 147 were children and 141 were women
attempting passage to Australia to be reunited with family members who had only been granted temporary
visas and, thus, could not bring their wives and children to join them for at least three years and perhaps
never. Richard C. Paddock, Bane of the Boat People, L.A. TtMES, Jan. 5,2002, at Al.
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22people continue to depart from Indonesia for Australia, in spite of the
newly enacted deterrence strategy.
Australia is not the only country to apply a strict categorical response
to unwanted boat people; the United States, for example, has also employed
a controversial high seas interdiction program to repel unwanted boat
migrants since the 1980s.23 Thus, Australia's refusal to process the Tampa
asylum seekers is merely an indication of the current deterrence trend in the
domestic migration policies of industrialized nations, signaling a retreat
from refugee protection as it exists within the language of the international
treaties. Australia's deterrence scheme, which appears to be only marginally
effective at dissuading desperate asylum seekers,24 violates the international
refugee protection obligations, 25 which include non-penalization for illegal
entry into the state's territory, prohibition of expulsion, and non-return to the
country of origin. Furthermore, Australia's scheme is unsustainable and
economically infeasible legal policy.
Part II of this Comment examines Australia's history of strict
immigration controls based on maintaining a distinct social and cultural
identity. Part III explores the international legal obligations relating to
refugee protection and presents the U.S. high seas interdiction program as an
example of the retreat from these obligations at the national level. Part IV
examines Australia's recent changes to its migration laws in light of shifting
migration patterns, perceived abuses of asylum procedures, and loopholes in
international law. Finally, Part V argues that Australia's response is not
only illegal in view of its international obligations, but is also unsustainable
and economically infeasible legal policy.
22 The Australian navy has escorted at least four boats back to Indonesia since the Tampa crisis.
Navy Turns Boat Back to Indonesia, AGE, Dec. 22,2001, LEXIS, News Library, Australia Publications.
23 For a discussion of the U.S. interdiction policy, see infra Part III.B.2.
24 Yet to be published figures show 1823 people headed to Australia in September and October of
2001-almost four times that of September and October of 2000 and more than double the two-month high
of 657 in the spring of 1999. George Megalogenis, Record Boat People Influx is Sinking PM's Policy,
AUSTRALIAN, Nov. 6, 2001, LEXIS, News Library. Although boat arrivals at Australian territorial islands
have decreased since October, Prime Minister John Howard admitted that he could not say how much of
the reduction in the numbers of boat people was due to his deterrence schemes and how much was due to
the monsoon season. Mike Steketee, No Excuse for All This Inhumanity, AUSTRALIAN, Jan. 30, 2002,
LEXIS, News Library; see also Belinda Hickman, No Boats on Horizon as Cyclone Arrives, AUSTRALIAN,
Feb. 6, 2002, LEXIS, News Library.
25 See infra Part III.A.
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1I. HISTORICAL BACKDROP: TRANSITION FROM THE "WHITE AUSTRALIA"
POLICY
Historically, Australia maintained strict immigration controls based on
racial and ethnic discrimination, commonly called the "White Australia"
policy.26 The Immigration Restriction Act of 190127 used a dictation test to
favor Europeans and discreetly disqualify non-Europeans from admission.28
Post-World War II legislation was directed toward the removal of Asian and
other non-white migrants who had fled to Australia during the war.29
Moreover, those immigrants who were permitted to enter were required to
sign two-year employment contracts with the Australian Government, such
that they could not compete with citizens for union jobs. 30 The shift away
from overtly racist and discriminatory migration policies began with the
abolishment of the controversial dictation test in 195831 and the formal
dismantling of the "White Australia" policy by the Whitlam Labor
Government in 1973.32
In a bipartisan effort, successive governments tried to further improve
non-discriminatory migration policies.33 In 1973, the short-lived Whitlam
Government took bold steps to remove race as a factor in Australia's
immigration policies.34 The Fraser Coalition Government, which came into
office in 1975, and the succeeding Hawke Labor Government in 1983,
continued to stress multiculturalism 35 such that Asia became a main source
of immigrants in the 1980s and 1990s. 36
Despite the gradual development of this non-racial immigration
policy, Australia made major shifts away from accepting and
26 Robert Birrell, Immigration Control in Australia, 534 ANNAis AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 106,
108 (1994). Birrell argues that Australia's current immigration policy is stricter than North American
policies and "can be traced to [Australia's] heritage of control." Id. at 106.27 The Immigration Restriction Act 1901 was renamed the Immigration Act 1901 in 1912, and
repealed by the Migration Act 1958.28 MARY CROCK, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW IN AuSTRALIA 13 (1998). The desire for
uniformity in immigration laws was one of the more pressing reasons favoring the federation of the
colonies and the establishment of the Australian Commonwealth in 1901. Id. The Immigration Restriction
Act 1901 used a difficult language test to exclude uneducated, non-white applicants by requiring them to
"write out at dictation and sign in the presence of an officer, a passage of fifty words in length in an
European language directed by the officer." Id. (quoting Immigration Restiction Act 1901 § 3(a)).
29 Id. at 19.
0 Birrell, supra note 26, at 108.
31 CROCK, supra note 28, at 19.
32 Id. at 7.
33 Id.
14 Id. at 33-34.
35 Gianni Zappala & Stephen Castles, Citizenship and Immigration in Australia, 13 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 273, 291-92 (1999).
36 See id. at 275.
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accommodating onshore asylum seekers beginning in the 1990s. 37 Changes
to migration policy were sparked by a sudden rise in asylum seekers from
the People's Republic of China and Cambodia from 1989 to 199238 and with
the election of the Liberal-National Party Coalition by a large majority in
1996. In recent years, Australia has introduced a variety of deterrence
measures in an attempt to manage or stop the arrival of asylum seekers on its
territory.40 These measures include legislative provisions directed toward
dissuading potential migrants by restricting judicial review;41 by creating
"mandatory detention" for those who arrive without a visa; 2 and by
employing a two-tiered visa protection program, which grants permanent
protection visas to those who apply from overseas and temporary protection
visas to those who arrive without a visa.43 These provisions enacted in the
1990s acknowledge a retreat to a posture of self-determination, in which
Australia chooses its refugees for resettlement from overseas, rather than
accommodating people who show up on shore.
While early immigration policies were overtly fixed on maintaining
the "White Australia" social and cultural identity by making race and
ethnicity the principal qualifying factors for immigrants,"n the recent focus
of migration law has been fixed on border control and on measures that
maximize the economic worth of the migration program45 (albeit indirectly
37 Andreas Schloenhardt, Australia and the Boat-People: 25 Years of Unauthorised Arrivals, 23(3)
U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 33, 43 (2000).
38 CROCK, supra note 28, at 128. Contributing factors were the violent repression of pro-democracy
demonstrators at Tiananmen Square and civil war in Cambodia. Id. at 128.
39 Zappala & Castles, supra note 35, at 294. "For the first time in over a decade, migration policy
ceased to be a bi-partisan affair." CROCK, supra note 27, at 50.
40 Guy S. GOODWIN-GiLL, ARTICLE 31 OF THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF
REFUGEES: NON-PENALIZATION, DETENTION AND PROTECTION 23 (UNHCR Global Consultations 2001),
http://www.unhcr.ch. For a detailed discussion of Australian legislative measures taken to deter
immigration from 1989 to 1999, see Schloenhardt, supra note 37, at 43-54.
, Hon. Phillip Ruddock, Refugee Claims and Australian Migration Law. A Ministerial Perspective,
23(3) U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 1, 8 (2000) [hereinafter Refugee Claims]. The Migration Legislation
Amendment Act 1989 first limited judicial review by introducing a statutory merits review system. Id.
The Migration Reform Act 1992 further limited judicial review by introducing Part 8 of the Migration Act,
restricting federal court jurisdiction in migration decisions. Id.; CROCK, supra note 28, at 271.
42 CROCK, supra note 28, at 271. Without a visa, non-citizens in Australia are subject to mandatory
detention and removal from the country per sections 189 and 198 of the Migration Act. Id.
" In 1999, the Australian Government amended the Migration Regulations 1994 such that asylum
seekers who had established refugee status, but had entered Australia without legal documentation,
categorically obtain three-year Temporary Protection Visas ("TPV"), "subclass 785 visa." Esmaeili &
Wells, supra note 1, at 234. For further discussion on Australia's TPV, see infra note 106 and
accompanying text.
CROCK, supra note 28, at Il.
45 id.
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reflecting social and cultural issues).46 After the 2001 Border Protection
Act, Migration Amendment Acts, and Migration Legislation Amendment
Acts,47 Australia's domestic legislation not only continues to contravene the
Government's obligations under international treaties, but also is an
unsustainable and economically infeasible legal policy given the issues that
have emerged from changing migration patterns, such as mass influxes of
asylum seekers from new source countries; the difficulty in distinguishing
between economic migrants and refugees; the increasing visibility of people
smuggling networks; and the proximity of asylum states to developing
countries, like Indonesia, with little or no capacity to process refugees.
III. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS AND NATIONAL
IMPLEMENTATION
Australia is party to international treaties governing refugee
protection. Australia, however, is not alone in its failure to fully consider
the obligations and ideals of the international treaties in the context of boat
people. In the United States, for example, the Coast Guard has intercepted
unwanted boat migrants since the 1980s. 48 Based on the U.S. reaction to
mass migrations of boat people from Haiti, it is likely that the United States
would also respond to a Tampa-like crisis as Australia has responded.49
4 In fiscal year 2000-01, the 43% and 39%, respectively, of Offshore resettlement grants in the
refugee category and special humanitarian category were issued to Europeans. DEPARTMENT OF
IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, POPULATION FLows: IMMIGRATION
ASPECTS 27 (Feb. 2002 ed.), http://www.immi.gov.au/statistics/index.htn [hereinafter POPULATION FLows
2002]. For a discussion of Australia's Offshore Resettlement Program, see infra note 102 and
accompanying text. The Australian Government's fiscal year ends June 30. Mason, supra note 3, at 8.
4 Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act, 2001 (Austl.); Migration
Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act, 2001 (Austl.); Migration Amendment (Excision from
Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Act, 2001 (Austl.); Migration Legislation Amendment Act,
No. 1, 2001 (Austl.); Migration Legislation Amendment Act, No. 5, 2001 (Austl.); Migration Legislation
Amendment Act, No. 6, 2001 (Austl.); and Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act, 2001
(Austl.), available at http://scaleplus.law.gov.au (last visited Mar. 9, 2002).
48 It is interesting to compare Australia and the United States in the immigration context because
both are large, industrialized nations with scarcely populated rural areas, ethnically diverse cities, and
expansive perimeter coastlines that are difficult to patrol. Furthermore, both countries are closely situated
to other developing nations, neither country is war-tom, and both countries are primarily comprised of
descendents of immigrants. A significant difference is that Australia, unlike the United States, has no
Coast Guard.
'9 Research conducted by U.S. pollster Wirthlin Worldwide group between January 18 and 21, 2002
on U.S. public opinion showed that 71% of Americans in the poll supported Australia's right to turn back
boats containing illegal migrants. Glen Milne, Critics on Wrong End of Poll, AUSTRALIAN, Feb. 4, 2002,
LEXIS, News Library.
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A. Refugee Protection in International Law
1. Refugee Convention and Protocol
Largely prompted by the tragedy of European Jews and the plight of
other millions of war-displaced European people, the 1951 Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees ("Refugee Convention") and the 1967
Protocol ("Protocol") 5°  are the principal international instruments
established for refugee protection. 1  States Parties to the Refugee
Convention and Protocol undertake to accord certain standards of treatment
to refugees and to guarantee them certain rights,52  including non-
penalization for illegal entry into a state's territory, prohibition of expulsion,
and nonrefoulement.53 Today, 141 States Parties have agreed to compromise
state sovereignty in the interest of protecting the world's fourteen million
refugees. 4
At the heart of the Refugee Convention and Protocol is the definition
of a "refugee" as any person who
50 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees opened for signature July 28, 1951 (19 U.S.T. 6259;
189 U.N.T.S. 150; A.T.S. 1954/5), available at http://untreaty.un.org [hereinafter Refugee Convention];
United Nations Protocol to the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees opened for signature Jan. 31,
1967 (A.T.S. 1973/37; 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6224(E), 6230(F); 606 U.N.T.S. 267) [hereinafter Protocol],
available at http://untreaty.un.org. The 1967 Protocol incorporated the "well-founded fear" definition of
the 1951 Refugee Convention's Article I but eliminated the "time and place" limitations. KAREN MUSALO
ET AL., REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 57 (2002). States Parties to the 1967 Protocol also agreed to be bound
by Articles 2-34 of the 1951 Convention. Id. As of January 1, 2002, there were 141 States Parties to either
the Refugee Convention or Protocol or both. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, States
Parties to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Jan. 1, 2002), http://www.unhcr.ch
[hereinafter States Parties]. Australia is party to both the Refugee Convention and Protocol; the United
States is party only to the Protocol. Id. Asia is the region where the least states have ratified the Refugee
Convention and Protocol. Id.; see also Joan Fitzpatrick, Taking Stock: The Refugee Convention at 50, in
U.S. CoMMIEE FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 22 (2001) [hereinafter Taking Stock] (stating
that "[w]hile states continue to ratify the Convention and its 1967 Protocol, serious gaps remain, especially
in Asia.").
51 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Introductory Note to the 1951 Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
http://www.unhcr.ch (Mar. 1996).
52 The implementation of the Refugee Convention is decentralized; states choose how to implement
the provisions themselves, whether by "legislative incorporation, administrative regulation, informal and ad
hoc procedures, or a combination thereof." GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 40, at 31.
53 Refugee Convention, supra note 50, arts. 1, 31-33. Nonrefoulement is a technical term for
protection, deriving from Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, and meaning an obligation of non-return of
a refugee to a country where the refugee's life or freedom would be threatened on account of one of the
five reasons listed in Article 1. David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the
Coast of Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1247, 1255-56 (1990).
54 States Parties, supra note 50. At the end of 2000, 14.5 million refugees and asylum seekers were
in need of protection. U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 4 (2001) [hereinafter
WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 2001]. Furthermore, intemally displaced persons are estimated at more than 20
million. Id. at 6.
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owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality or membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing
to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
55
Article 31 of the Refugee Convention prohibits "penalties" imposed
on refugees, 56 such that States Parties
shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or
presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory
where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of
article 1, enter or are present in their territory without
authorization, provided they present themselves without delay
to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or
presence.57
Article 31 can be interpreted as an obligation for States Parties to
refrain from adopting practices that might deter certain refugees from
seeking protection there or as a duty to treat all asylum seekers alike without
discriminating between legal and illegal migrants.58
Article 32 of the Refugee Convention prohibits contracting States
Parties from "expel[ling] a refugee lawfully in their territory save on
grounds of national security or public order" and only "in pursuance of a
decision reached in accordance with due process of law."59 Finally, Article
15 Refugee Convention, supra note 50, art. I.
56 "Although expressed in terms of the refugee, [the Refugee Convention] provision would be devoid
of all effect unless it also extended, at least over a certain time, to asylum seekers . . . [who are]
'presumptive refugees."' GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 40, at 8 (quoting R. v. Uxbridge Magistrates Court,
exparte Adimi, Imm. A.R. 560 (U.K. 1999)).
57 Refugee Convention, supra note 50, art. 31(1).
58 Esmacili & Wells, supra note 1, at 229. The term "penalties" is not defined in Article 31 of the
Refugee Convention, but the drafters appear to have considered measures such as prosecution, fine, and
imprisonment. GOODWtN-GiLL, supra note 40, at 9. Administrative detention, however, is allowed under
Article 31(2) of the Refugee Convention when it is necessary to investigate the circumstances of entry or to
obtain information about unknown persons. Id.
59 Refugee Convention, supra note 50, art. 32. Australia might attempt to argue grounds of national
security based on the terrorism attack on the United States on September 11, 2001 and the subsequent "War
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33 of the Refugee Convention imposes a protection obligation of
nonrefoulement, or non-return to a country in which the asylum seeker's life
or freedom would be threatened, regardless of whether the asylum seeker
has valid travel documents to justify his or her presence in the country.60
2. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
The UNHCR was established in 1950, shortly before the drafting of
the Refugee Convention, as the international supervisory agency for
implementing refugee protection and promoting durable solutions to the
problem of refuge.6' The functions of the UNHCR are far more complex
today than they were in 1951, as the organization blends its state-supervisory
and refugee-protection roles by attempting to enforce the protection
provisions of the Refugee Convention, as well as contributing hands-on to
62
refugee determination when states fail to process refugees. Moreover, the
UNHCR is sustained by donations from the States Parties to the Refugee
Convention and Protocol.63 These complexities leave the UNHCR with little
policing power when domestic systems diverge from international
obligations.64 As a result, refugee determination is made either at the
domestic level by the administrative or judicial processes of individual
Against Terrorism." The Tampa incident, however, began two weeks before the September 11 attack
occurred in the United States.
60 Refugee Convention, supra note 50, art. 33. Under Article 33, the receiving nation technically
remains free to send a refugee, who has been granted asylum by the receiving nation, on to another country
rather than granting asylum on its soil. Martin, supra note 53, at 1255-56. Receiving nations, however,
rarely find other countries to take refugees. See Megan Saunders, New Zealand 'Next Smuggling Target,'
AUSTRALIAN, Jan. 17, 2002, LEXIS, News Library [hereinafter Next Smuggling Target].
61 The UNHCR was established on December 14, 1950 by the United Nations General Assembly.
Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, G.A. Res. 428(V), U.N.
GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 46, U.N. Doe. A/1775 (1950), http://www.unhcr.ch [hereinafter Statute
of the UNHCR].
62 Taking Stock, supra note 50, at 24. For example, the UNHCR implored Australia to process the
Tampa asylum seekers in Australia, but when Australia refused the UNHCR proceeded to step in and
process the boat migrants at Nauru. See supra note 9 and accompanying text; see also Megan Saunders,
Nauru Refugee Decisions Imminent, AUSTRALIAN, Jan. 3, 2002, LEXIS, News Library (noting that once the
UNHCR is finished processing "Pacific Solution" asylum seekers and successful claims have been
determined, the individual cases will be submitted to traditional resettlement countries).
63 Taking Stock, supra note 50, at 24 (noting the UNHCR's budget relies upon voluntary donations
from the states whose compliance it monitors). Australia contributed USD 1.13 per capita in 2000, totaling
USD 21.7 million; the United States contributed USD 1.40 per capita in 2000, totaling USD 387.1 million.
WORLD REFUGEE SURvEY 2001, supra note 54, at 10.
6 Taking Stock, supra note 50, at 24.
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nation states or, when states fail to act, at the international level by the
UNHCR itself.65
At the international level, the UNHCR implements procedures to
identify refugees when national authorities have no resources to process
asylum seekers, such as Indonesia or Nauru, or merely refuse to participate
in processing.66  The UNHCR promotes three solutions to the problem of
refuge for States Parties: voluntary repatriation of the refugee to her country
of origin, local integration in the country of first asylum, and resettlement in
a third country. 67 However, some States Parties, such as Australia and the
United States, have established domestic strategies to address recent changes
in migration patterns that diverge from these solutions and the ideals of the
Refugee Convention.
B. Refugee Protections in the United States
The United States includes the important provisions of the Refugee
Convention and Protocol in its statutory refugee law. In practice, however,
the United States diverges from these obligations, with the interdiction
program as an example.
1. Statutory Refugee Law in the United States
Refugee protection in the United States derives from the provisions of
the Refugee Convention and Protocol, with the definition of a refugee at its
core.68  The United States provides three forms of relief for persons fleeing
65 The Australian Minister of Immigration Affairs asserts that the function of the UNHCR in
determining refugee status is part of its mandate. See Refugee Claims, supra note 41, at I (citing Statute of
the UNHCR, supra note 61, cbs. I & II).
6 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Protecting Refugees-An Introduction, at
http://www.unbcr.ch (Dec. 1, 2000).
67 Id.; MUSALO, MOORE & BOSWELL, supra note 50, at 43-45.
68 ANKER, supra note 1, at 3. The United States defines a "refugee" as:
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person
having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and
who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of
the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion ....
Immigration and Naturalization Act § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C.A. § l101(a)(42)(A) (West 2000 & Supp.
2001). In the United States, the basic source of refugee law is the Immigration and Nationality Act
("INA"), codified in Title 8 of the United States Code. See generally ANKER, supra note 1, at ch. 1.
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69persecution: refugee status, asylum, and withholding of deportation.
Refugee status (also known as the Overseas Refugee Program)70 under U.S.
law, like Australia's Offshore Protection Program,7' is available to persons
applying from outside the United States who have been identified as persons
of "special humanitarian concern. 72 The number of refugee admissions,
currently set at 50,000, is limited by region, with a system of priorities
determined each year by statutory consultation between the Executive and
Congress.73
Asylum status, in contrast to refugee status, is available to persons
seeking protection either from within the United States or at its borders,74
and, unlike the refugee provision, requires no prior designation that the
person is a refugee "of special humanitarian concern., 75 The main criteria
for asylum are contained in the basic refugee definition: persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.76 U.S. asylum
law is formally discretionary 77 and, in contrast to Australia's system,
78
generally has no numerical or categorical limitations to grants of asylum.79
Withholding of deportation-based on the Refugee Convention's
Article 33 obligation of nonrefoulement-is usually a companion form of
relief to asylum.80  Whereas the asylum provision is discretionary,8' the U.S.
69 ANKER, supra note 1, at 4-5; Immigration and Naturalization Act §§ 207, 208, 241(b)(3) (formerly
§ 243(h)), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1157, 1158(a)(1), 123 l(b)(3) (West 2000 & Supp. 2001).
MUSALO, MOORE & BOSWELL, supra note 50, at 67.
71 See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
72 § 207; ANKER, supra note 1, at 4.
71 § 207.
74 ANKER, supra note 1, at 4 (citing § 208(a)(1)).
71 Id. at 5.
76 Id. at 4-5.
77 Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(b)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(1) (West 2000 & Supp. 2001)
("The Attorney General may grant asylum to an alien who has applied for asylum in accordance with the
requirements and procedures established by the Attorney General under this section if the Attorney General
determines that such alien is a refugee within the meaning of section 101(a)(42)(A), [definition of a
refugee].").
78 See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
79 ANKER, supra note 1, at 5.
8o Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1231(b)(3) (West 2000 & Supp. 2001);
ANKER, supra note 1, at 5. Section 243(h) is the predecessor to what the 1996 Act redesignated as §
241(b)(3). T.A. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP PROCESS AND POLICY 1033 (4th ed.
1998).
s1 Matter of Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. 311, 315 (BIA 1982), quoted in ALIENIKOFF, MARTIN &
MOTOMURA, supra note 60, at 1033-34. In Matter of Salim, the Board explained the relationship between
the asylum provision, § 208, and the withholding provision, then § 243(h) (redesignated as § 241(b)(3) in
1996):
Section 243(h) relief is "country specific" and accordingly, the applicant here would be presently
protected from deportation to Afghanistan pursuant to § 243(h). But that section would not
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1980 Refugee Act transformed the withholding provision into a mandatory
provision.82 Although the core substantive grounds are the same for asylum,
withholding protects a person from return to the country of persecution, but
does not grant asylum status in the United States.
83
2. The Era of Deterrence
Despite seemingly genuine attempts to conform to the obligations of
international law, the United States began to institute its deterrence scheme
for boat people in the 1980s.84  The boatlift in 1980 from the Cuban port of
Mariel8 brought over 125,000 Cuban asylum seekers to the United States
within only a few short months.86 As Cubans flooded into the United States,
many people started thinking about how to avoid mass migration situations
in the future. 87  In response, the Select Commission on Immigration and
Refugee Policy made a series of recommendations for managing mass
migration emergencies, such as adopting policies and procedures to
effectively deter illegal migration of those who will not likely meet the
criteria of asylum. 88  The U.S. interdiction program89 is one such scheme
prevent his exclusion and deportation to Pakistan or any other hospitable country ... if that
country will accept him. In contrast, asylum is a greater form of relief. When granted asylum,
the alien may be eligible to apply for adjustment of status to that of a lawful permanent resident
pursuant to § 209 of the Act, after residing here one year, subject to numerical limitations and
the applicable regulations. Id.
82 Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980). Congress enacted the Refugee Act of 1980 in order to
conform U.S. refugee law to the Protocol's directives. See ANKER, supra note 1, at 9 n.42 (citing INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987)) ("If one thing is clear from the legislative history of the
new definition of 'refugee,' and indeed the entire 1980 Act, it is that one of Congress' primary purposes
was to bring United States refugee law into conformance with the [Protocol], to which the United States
acceded in 1968."). Moreover, important textual changes were made to the withholding provision in 1980
to track more closely the international obligations assumed by the United States when it ratified the
Protocol in 1968. Joan Fitzpatrick, The International Dimension of U.S. Refugee Law, 15 BERK. J. INT'L L.
1,6 (1997).
83 ANKER, supra note 1, at 6.
84 ALEINIKOFF ETAL., supra note 80, at 1155.
" In 1980, Fidel Castro opened the Cuban port of Mariel. Matthew A. Pingeton, Comment, United
States Immigration Policy: Detaining Cuban Refugees Taken from the Sea, 8 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y
329, 330 (1999). In six months, over 125,000 Cubans emigrated from the port of Mariel to the United
States. Id.86 ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 80, at 1155.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 1155-56.
89 The interdiction program was commenced pursuant to the U.S.-Haiti Interdiction Agreement,
under which the Haitian Government assured that repatriated Haitians would not be subject to punishment
upon return to Haiti for their illegal departure. Agreement on Migrants-Interdiction, Sept. 23, 1981, U.S.-
Haiti, 33 U.S.T. 3559, 3560, T.I.A.S. No. 10241, cited in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155,
160 n.8 (1993). In the 1980s, the U.S. Coast Guard boarded any Haitian vessel that appeared to be carrying
migrants and transferred the migrants to Coast Guard cutters. Id. at 161. The migrants were interviewed
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designed to deter boat migrants: preliminary asylum screening is conducted
on the high seas to exploit the water separation between other nations and
U.S. soil.9°
The interdiction program came under great scrutiny after thousands of
Haitian asylum seekers were returned to a land where they likely faced
persecution without receiving any preliminary asylum screenings.91 In 1993,
however, the United States Supreme Court held in Sale v. Haitian Centers
Council that neither domestic law (the withholding provision 92) nor
international law (nonrefoulement93) limits the Executive's power to order
the Coast Guard to repatriate illegal migrants intercepted on the high seas.
94
The MV Tampa incident is notably different from the repatriation of
Haitian asylum seekers. The Haitians were involuntarily returned to their
country of origin. The Tampa migrants, on the other hand, were repelled
from Australia, but they were not returned to their country of origin.
Instead, they were processed for asylum by the UNHCR in surrounding
"declared countries." 95 Although Article 33 nonrefoulement applied to the
by asylum officers, and any passenger who substantiated a "well-founded fear of persecution" was
transported to the United States to apply for asylum. Id. at 161-62. The others were returned to Haiti. Id.
From 1981 to 1991, 25,000 Haitian boat migrants were intercepted and only twenty-eight were transported
to the United States for asylum processing. Christopher Mitchell, U.S. Policy Toward Haitian Boat People,
1972-93, 534 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & SOC. Sa. 69, 73-74. The costs of the U.S. interdiction program
were approximately USD 30 million per year during the 1980s. Id.
9 Mitchell, supra note 89, at 71. The deterrent effect of interdiction was considerable; in 1980 alone
24,530 Haitian migrants were arrested in south Florida, while in the succeeding eight years a total of
21,906 were apprehended there. Id. at 74.
9' A military coup toppled the government of Jean Bertrand Aristide on September 30, 1981,
resulting in serious human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings by the security forces and partisan
mobs, disappearances, torture and other mistreatment of prisoners, arbitrary arrests, and executive
interference with the judicial process. See Department of State, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices for 1992, at 421; Department of State 102d Cong., 2d Sess., Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices for 1991, at 633-34. Prior to the involuntary repatriation of Haitians, 32.6% of
Haitians who were processed at Guantanamo Bay were permitted to apply for asylum. Mitchell, supra note
89, at 74. After Aristide's overthrow, U.S. interdiction costs were estimated at four times that of the 1980s.
Id. at 75.
92 Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(b)(3) (formerly § 243(h)(1)), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1231(b)(3)
(West 2000 & Supp. 2001).
93 Refugee Convention, supra note 50, art. 33.
'4 509 U.S. 155, 159 (1993). This conclusion directly contradicts the UNHCR's position that the
Article 33 obligations of nonrefoulement apply "whenever a State acts," including in territorial and
extraterritorial waters. Brief of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, McNary v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993)
(No. 92-344) [hereinafter UNHCR Brief].
95 A "declared country" is specified in writing by the Minister of Immigration as a country that "(i)
provides access for persons seeking asylum, to effective procedures for assessing their needs for protection;
and (ii) provides protection for persons seeking asylum, pending determination of their refugee status; and
(iii) provides protection to persons who are given refugee status, pending their voluntary repatriation to
their country of origin or resettlement in another country; and (iv) meets relevant human rights standards in
providing that protection." Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential
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Haitian asylum seekers, while Article 31 non-penalization as well as Article
32 prohibition of expulsion applied to the Tampa asylum seekers, both
incidents involved the repelling of asylum seekers from their destination
asylum state merely because of their form of arrival-by boat. 96 Despite this
difference, the U.S. and Australian responses are similar because both were
quick political reactions to drastic changes in migration patterns. Driven b,
concerns over public reactions and perceptions, leaders in both countries
attempted to stop boat migration by eliminating the asylum-grant magnet.
IV. AUSTRALIA'S NEW MIGRATION POLICY
Australia, as a party to the Refugee Convention and Protocol, has
recently incorporated changes into its migration policy that retreat from the
international principles of refugee protection established post-World War II.
Thus, the applicability of international law in mass boat migration situations
has become uncertain as States Parties, such as Australia and the United
States, introduce divergent interpretations. 97 These policies of categorically
repelling boat migrants are not only illegal at the international level, but they
are unsustainable and economically infeasible at the domestic level.
A. International Law Incorporated in Australian Migration Law
Although Australia signed and ratified both the Refugee Convention
and the Protocol, it does not fully incorporate the treaty provisions into its
domestic laws. 98 Nevertheless, Australia does show an intention to conform
to the international regime for refugee protection. For example, Australia
indirectly incorporates the Refugee Convention Article 1 definition of a
refugee in its domestic law, identifying to whom Australia has protection
Provisions) Act, 2001 (Austl.); see also Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous
Affairs, Australian Immigration Fact Sheet No. 75: Processing Unlawful Boat Arrivals, at
http://www.immi.gov.au/facts/75processing_l.htm (last modified Nov. 14, 2001).
96 Interestingly, the Australian Full Court did not address the applicability of Article 31(1) in
Ruddock v. Vardarlis. 183 A.L.R. 1 (Sept. 18, 2001). GOODWIN-GU.., supra note 40, at 24 n.27.
97 Taking Stock, supra note 50, at 22.
98 CROCK, supra note 28, at 123, 126; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for
signature May 23, 1969 (1155 U.N.T.S. 331, A.T.S. 1974/2). Notwithstanding that Australia is a party to
the 1969 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties and agrees to comply with international obligations in
good faith, international instruments have little effect without incorporation into its domestic legislation.
See Mary Crock, A Sanctuary Under Review: Where to From Here for Australia's Refugee and
Humanitarian Program, 23(3) U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 246, 256 (2000) [hereinafter Sanctuary Under
Review]. Australia acceded to the Vienna Convention on June 13, 1974 and it came into force on January
27, 1980. Id. at 256 n.41
VOL. I I No. 2
AUSTRALIA "S "PACIFIC SOLUTION"
obligations.99 Moreover, Australia partially implemented the Refugee
Convention through the Migration Act of 1958 ("Migration Act") by
establishing protection visas for non-citizens who qualify for refugee
status.'00
The current Australian regime for refugee determination is two-tiered
with an Offshore Resettlement Program and an Onshore Protection
Program. 1° 1 The Offshore Resettlement Program accommodates overseas
applicants: refugees and people of humanitarian concern. 0 2 The Onshore
Protection Program, on the other hand, allows asylum seekers who are
already in Australia-whether they arrived on temporary visas or in an
unauthorized manner-to apply for a protection visa in accordance with the
nonrefoulement provision of the Refugee Convention. 10 3  Together, the
Offshore and Onshore programs have allowed 12,000 admissions per year
since 1999.1°4
Unlike the system in the United States, Australia grants only
temporary protection to a refugee who arrived without legal documentation,
e.g., a visa. Applicants who engage refugee protection in Australia are
granted one of two types of protection visas: a Permanent Protection Visa
("PPV") for refugees who entered Australia lawfully (e.g., on a tourist or
student visa)'05 or a Temporary Protection Visa ("TPV") for refugees who
entered Australia in an unauthorized manner (e.g., without a temporary
99 CROCK, supra note 28, at 126. Reference is made to the Refugee Convention in Migration Act §
5(1) and in Migration Regulations 1994 Schedule 2, cl. 866. Id.
100 Migration Act § 36 provides a protection visa to "a non-citizen in Australia to whom the Minister
is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the
Refugees Protocol ......
01 Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Australian Immigration
Fact Sheet 60: Australia's Refugee and Humanitarian Program, at http://www.imni.gov.au/facts/
60refugee.htm (last modified Nov. 8, 2001) [hereinafter Fact Sheet 60].
102 Id. While the Refugee Program is for people who are outside their home country but subject to
persecution in their home country, the Special Humanitarian Program is for people who are also outside
their home country but subject to substantial discrimination amounting to a gross violation of human rights
in their home country. Id. An applicant for the Special Humanitarian Program must be sponsored or
supported by people resident in or an organization based in Australia. Id.
103 POPULATION FLOWS 2002, supra note 46, at 24.
104 Id. at 25. As a result of the increase of unauthorized arrivals in 2001, the size of the Offshore
program is still under consideration. Id. In 2000-01, 8000 visas were allocated to Offshore applicants
(4000 visas for the Offshore Refugee Program; 4000 visas for the Offshore Special Humanitarian
Program). DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, POPULATION
FLOWS: IMMIGRATION ASPECTS 24 (Dec. 2000), http://www.immi.gov.au/statistics/index.htm. The
remainder of places were allocated to Onshore asylum seekers. Id. By policy decision, if the number of
Onshore visas exceeds the number allocated, then the number of Offshore visas are reduced accordingly so
that the number of refugees never exceeds 12,000. David Corlett, Politics, Symbolism and the Asylum
Seeker Issue, 23(3) U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 13, 18 (2000).
'05 Migration Regulations of 1994, sched. 2, pt. 866, http://scaleplts.law.gov.au; POPULATION FLOWS
2002, supra note 46, at 28.
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visa). 10 6 The three-year TPV was introduced in October 1999,107 after the
number of unauthorized boat people rose from 921 in fiscal year 1998-99 to
4175 in 1999-00,'08 as an attempt to counterbalance the great increase in the
number of unauthorized boat arrivals. 09 Thus, "in order to discourage the
perception of Australia as a soft target," 110 asylum seekers who arrive
illegally, e.g., by boat and without a visa, and who are owed protection
obligations by Australia, are only provided with a temporary residence
solution.' 11
B. Recent Changes in Migration Patterns Affecting National Policies
The Tampa asylum seekers provoked political action in Australia only
because of the upsurge in undocumented arrivals in the previous week.
Three boats carrying over 1000 asylum seekers had arrived on Australian
territorial islands in the week immediately preceding the Tampa incident. 1' 2
This drastic change in Australia's boat migration pattems-a great influx of
migrants from new source countries facilitated by people smugglers who
operate out of Indonesia-and the Refugee Convention's failure to address
these issues has led Australia to develop a scheme to deter asylum seekers
who arrive by boat.
1. Influx of Boat Migrants from New Source Countries
With changing international conditions, countries with established
patterns of accepting asylum seekers are now under intense pressure to
process increased numbers of applicants from new source countries. While
Australia has traditionally received waves of immigrants from neighboring
East Asian and Pacific states,1 13 recent statistics show that most asylum
'06 Migration Regulations 1994, sched. 2, pt. 785; POPULATION FLOWS 2002, supra note 46, at 28.
107 Migration Amendment Regulations, No. 12, 1999, http://scaleplus.law.gov.au. Holders of TPVs
are not entitled to the same benefits as holders of PPVs, such as access to social programs, the right to
family reunification, or the automatic right of return should they need to travel abroad. GOODWIN-GILL,
supra note 40, at 24; see also Esmaeili & Wells, supra note I, at 234-35.
'0S Philip Ruddock, Background Paper on Unauthorized Arrivals Strategy, at http://www.minister.
imm.gov.au/mediareleases/media0/rO131tables.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2002) [hereinafter
Background Paper]; Mason, supra note 3, at 1.
log Refugee Claims, supra note 41, at 3-4.
110 Id. at 4.
111 Id,
112 The first group of 348 people landed on Christmas Island on August 16, a second boat with 230
people reached Ashmore Reef on August 20, and a third boat carrying 360 persons landed on Christmas
Island on August 22. Mason, supra note 3, at 8.
"1 See supra Part II.
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seekers who arrive in Australia by boat and without valid travel documents
are from new source countries, Afghanistan and Iraq.'" 4 During 1999-2000,
4175 unauthorized migrants arrived on the nation's shores by boat, with
eighty-five percent of the migrants from Afghanistan and Iraq." 5 Arrivals
continued to stream into Australia at this high level in 2000-2001, recorded
at 4141,116 with seventy-eight percent from Afghanistan and Iraq.''
7
More significant, however, than the mere upsurge in migration is the
lack of a political relationship between Australia and these new source
countries. Although some civil liberties groups vehemently oppose
Australia's migration policies," 8 the political pressure that these groups
exert is not strong enough to influence policy-makers. This is marked by the
bipartisan support for boat migration deterrence and tougher border control
during the November 2001 election." 9 In the United States, a long history
of disparate treatment of Haitians from an anti-communist nation and
Cubans from a communist one shows that foreign policy implications often
affect domestic immigration policy.' 20  Australia, unlike the United States,
has little political interaction with Afghanistan or Iraq; thus, the
consequences of refusing refugees are seemingly insignificant.
Meanwhile, the ambiguity of the word "territory" in Articles 31 and
32 of the Refugee Convention enables Australia to diverge in its
interpretation and to repel large numbers of boat migrants before they land.
The Refugee Convention is criticized by commentators for its ambiguity
regarding the rights of asylum seekers who are encountered in extra-
territorial waters.12' While Articles 31 and 32, respectively, prohibit States
114 In fiscal year 2000-01, 54% of boat arrivals were Afghan and 24% were Iraqi. Background Paper,
supra note 108. In fiscal year 1999-2000, 55% of boat arrivals were Iraqi and 30% were Afghan. Id.




is See John Shaw, Refugee Issue Clouds Visit by Australian to the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2002,
LEXIS, News Library.
119 Id.
120 Kevin R. Johnson, Los Olvidados: Images of the Immigrant, Political Power of Noncitizens, and
Immigration Law and Enforcement, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1139,1177 (1993).
121 Joan Fitzpatrick, Revitalizing the 1951 Refugee Convention, 9 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 229, 232
(1996) [hereinafter Revitalizing]. "Such criticism stems from four areas of weakness: (1) the vagueness
and manipulability of . . . the refugee definition; (2) the lack of an agreed framework for refugee
determination and the risks involved in harmonization efforts . . . ; (3) crucial substantive lacunae or
ambiguities, particularly the right to receive asylum, the right of admission, the rights of asylum-seekers
interdicted at sea, and the right of temporary refuge for forced migrants who do not qualify as Convention
refugees; and (4) key gaps in inter-state obligations, especially burden-sharing through admission or
refugees, security issues relating to refugee encampments and dependable financing of refugee prevention
and relief strategies." Id.
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Parties from "expel[ling] a refugee lawfully in their territory"'122 and from
"impos[ing] penalties on account of their illegal entry or presence,"'123 the
Refugee Convention fails to specifically address the treatment of potential
refugees who illegally land in external territories or who are intercepted en
route to their destined country of asylum.
Where the Refugee Convention fails to define the term "territory,"'
124
Australia's Parliament interposed a limited meaning and excised the
territorial islands from its migration zone in order to disclaim responsibility
for the mass influxes of Afghan and Iraqi asylum seekers who land there. 
25
Australia's Parliament merely followed in the footsteps of the U.S. Supreme
Court, which established that asylum seekers traveling to the United States
have no right to asylum processing if intercepted on the high seas. 1
26
2. Blurred Distinction Between the Economic Migrant and the Refugee
Individual status determination by States Parties is an arduous process
because a clear dichotomy between the economic migrant and the refugee is
not possible in most cases. While the economic migrant is typically one
"drawn" voluntarily to a new life in another country for personal or
economic reasons, the refugee is one "driven" to migration by the need to
find foreign state protection. 27  States withhold refugee protection from
persons who are merely seeking improved economic conditions because
economic migrants are not protected as refugees by the Protocol. 28 Today's
asylum seekers, however, are both drawn and driven, choosing to migrate in
response to a complex mix of political and economic considerations.
29
Thus, the line distinguishing a refugee from an economic migrant is often
blurred. 30 An asylum seeker's flight from his or her country of origin, even
if triggered by persecution, may also be influenced by other pull factors,'
3
'
such as family networks, language proficiency, religion, educational
opportunities, and economic opportunities in the country of asylum.
122 Refugee Convention, supra note 50, art. 32(1).
123 Id. art. 31(1).
124 Although the Refugee Convention does not unambiguously define "territory," the UNHCR has
interpreted the plain meaning of "territory" in Article 33 to impose the nonrefoulement obligation to "arise
wherever a State acts." See UNHCR Brief, supra note 94.
125 Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act, 2001 (Austl.).
126 See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993); supra Part III.B.2.
127 N.L. ZUCKER & N.F. ZUCKER, THE GUARDED GATE: THE REALITY OF AMERICAN REFUGEE
POLICY 143 (1987), quoted in Martin, supra note 53, at 1275.
:28 Protocol, supra note 50, art. l(A)(2).
129 See Martin, supra note 53, at 1275.
130 Id.
"3 Id.at 1276-77.
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Although many of the asylum seekers arriving in Australia may have
left conditions of economic hardship, most will still be classified as
refugees.13 2  In Iraq, not only is torture of political prisoners common,
including beheading and amputation of the tongue, 133 but economic
sanctions imposed by the United Nations, which were intended to arrest
Saddam Hussein's weapons program, have had a devastating impact on the
living conditions of common Iraqis.' 34  Moreover, in Afghanistan, the
Taliban imposed the strictest form of Islamic punishment in the world;
hence, many Afghans were severely punished for expressing unpopular
religious beliefs, being of the female gender, or having political affiliation in
an opposition group. 135  Although the conditions in Afghanistan have
changed with the fall of the Taliban regime in December 2001,136 most
Afghans and Iraqis who arrived in Australia prior to that date simply were
not economic migrants.
Status determination of asylum seekers is a difficult process for States
Parties to the Refugee Convention because Article 1 does not provide "a
simple, universal standard for separating the refugee from the economic
migrant."'' 37  Without a clear definition, States Parties inevitably establish
situation-dependent tests for status determination; for example, the U.S.
interdiction program only passed twenty-eight out of 25,000 Haitian
132 There are about 1100 asylum seekers on Nauru but, other than Ireland, which has agreed to accept
fifty, no other resettlement places have been secured. Next Smuggling Target, supra note 60. All but one
asylum seeker out of the 131 processed in New Zealand were granted refugee status and resettlement there.
Christopher Niesche, Afghans Find Hope in NZ, WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN, Feb. 2, 2002, LEXIS, News
Library. New Zealand further agreed to resettle 200 more refugees who were processed by the UNHCR in
Indonesia. Tim Dodd, NZ To Take 200 Refugees, AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL REV., Mar. 5, 2002, LEXIS,
News Library.
133 Amnesty Int'l, Amnesty International Report 2001: Middle East and North Africa Regional
Update, http://web.amnesty.org.
13' Eric Hoskins, The Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions and War in Iraq, in POLMCAL
GAiN AND CIVILtAN PAIN 91, 110-29 (Thomas G. Weiss et al. eds., 1997) (noting most Iraqi civilians live in
a state of extreme hardship and deprivation: health care, nutrition, education, water, sanitation, and other
basic services are at minimum levels); ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN & AHMED S. HASH1M, IRAQ: SANCTIONS
AND BEYOND 143 (1997) (noting the United Nations special commission investigating the impact of
sanctions on Iraq claimed that four million Iraqis were "at severe nutritional risk"); see also UN. Not
Celebrating on 10th Anniversary of Iraq Sanctions, DEUTSCHE PRESS-AGENTUR, Aug. 3, 2000, LEXIS,
News Library, World Publications (noting that the United Nations Children's Fund reported a dramatic
increase in the mortality rate for Iraqi children under five due to economic sanctions).
135 M.J. GOHARI, THE TALIBAN: ASCENT TO POWER 98-110 (2000); Amnesty Int'l, Amnesty
International Report 2001: Asia Regional Update, http://web.amnesty.org; see also PETER MARSDEN, THE
TALIBAN: WAR, RELIGION AND THE NEW ORDER IN AFGHANISTAN (1998).
136 Dexter Filkins, A Nation Challenged: Rise and Fall; The Legacy of the Taliban is a Sad and
Broken Land, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2001, at Al. Australian officials will offer financial incentives to
Afghan asylum seekers to return to their homeland. Steve Lewis & Aaron Patrick, Afghans Offered Cash
to Go Home, AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL REv., Feb. 1, 2002, LEXIS, News Library. The incentive scheme is
expected to mirror the scheme provided for Kosovar refugees, about AUD 4000 per family. Id.
137 Sanctuary Under Review, supra note 98, at 253.
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migrants intercepted between 1981 and 1991 through preliminary asylum
screening. 138  The rest were classified as economic migrants. 13 9  The
ambiguity in distinguishing economic migrants from refugees is further
complicated when the asylum seekers pass through other safe countries on
the way to Australia where they could have sought refuge, such as
Indonesia.
3. Proximity to Developing Countries
Australian authorities assert that, under the Refugee Convention,
asylum seekers should be processed in the first safe country that they
enter; 140  however, there are great difficulties with this approach.'
Indonesia, as well as other nations that asylum seekers may pass through
before arriving in Australia, may be safe for asylum seekers in that they will
not be subjected to persecution there; however, these supposed safe
countries may not seem safe from the perspective of the asylum seeker. For
example, Indonesia does not provide for the granting of asylum or refugee
status in accordance with the Refugee Convention or Protocol. 142 Although
the Indonesian government cooperates with the UNHCR to process asylum
seekers who arrive there, 143 the asylum seekers who are found to be valid
refugees in Indonesia must wait until a country with a resettlement program,
such as Australia or New Zealand, offers a resettlement grant. 144  Many
asylum seekers in Indonesia, become frustrated by the resettlement delays
:3' Mitchell, supra note 89, at 73.
39 Id.
14' Alison Crosweller & Megan Saunders, Refugees' Plight a 'Lifestyle Choice,' AUSTRALIAN, Jan. 8,
2002, LEXIS, News Library (reporting that Phillip Ruddock, Immigration Minister, claimed they were
"choosing to leave situations of safety and security.").
"' In some cases movement from a country of first asylum can be described as "irregular." Refugee
Protection, supra note 12, at 9. In other instances, the country of first asylum cannot provide adequate
protection at basic human rights standards. Id. The recommendation of the Global Consultations is that
States Parties should undertake responsibility to strengthen the capacity of ill-equipped countries of first
arrival to provide adequate protections for asylum seekers. Id.142 Department of State, 107d Cong., 2d Sess., Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2001,
at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/hr/c 1470.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2002).
143 Id.
144 As of December 31, 2001, the UNHCR had registered 2835 refugees and asylum seekers. Id.
New Zealand has agreed to accept 200 of the refugees in Indonesia who are waiting for resettlement;
Australia has only accepted one girl whose family drowned on a refugee boat. Tim Dodd, NZ To Take 200
Refugees, AUsTRALIAN FINANCIAL REV., Mar. 5, 2002, LEXIS, News Library. Refugees from the Middle
East and Afghanistan, who are temporarily accommodated in Indonesia, have caused consternation among
the residents, because the UNHCR living conditions are much better than the living conditions of most of
the host country residents. Dewi Anggraeni, Trickle Won't Swamp Us, AUSTRALIAN (Feb. 6, 2002),
LEXIS, News Library. As some Indonesian nationals told a reporter, "They eat three meals a day, their
normal meals include meat and chicken, their living quarters are big and comfortable .... "
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and still attempt the journey to Australia to claim Onshore protection there,
as evinced by the tragic deaths of the thirty processed refugees on the
overcrowded vessel which capsized in the Sunda Strait.1 45 Pakistan and Iran
are also questionable safe countries for ethnic minorities because of their
harsh treatment of Afghan refugees; asylum seekers in these countries have
not escaped all threats to life or freedom.'
46
Australia has attempted to develop a cooperation program with
Indonesia to manage the flow of illegal migrants passing through
Indonesia, 147 but Indonesia has a leaky border and many asylum seekers
arrive inconspicuously without being inspected by immigration officers at
the ports of entry.14 8  These migrants then continue their precarious journey
via rickety boats contracted by people smugglers. 149  Furthermore, there is
growing concern that the cooperative relationship between Indonesia and
Australia is no longer strong;' 50 Indonesia's navy chief, Admiral Indroko
Sastrowiryono, asserted that asylum seekers should be allowed to continue
their journeys to Australia "because it is their basic right."'151
4. People Smuggling Networks
While Australia has a substantial Offshore Resettlement Program,
52
upon which it has founded an international reputation as a generous
145 See supra text accompanying note 21.
146 Many Afghan refugees who have entered Pakistan since 1996 do not integrate well with other
Afghan refugees or with local Pushtuns. WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 2001, supra note 54, at 162. Some
Afghan refugees in Pakistan have been threatened or killed. Id. Moreover, most Afghan refugees in Iran
are undocumented; they live a marginal existence in constant fear of deportation and without rights to
work, to receive medical services, or to send their children to school. Id. at 176. See also Mason, supra
note 3, at 2.
147 Trading in Misery, AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL REV., Aug. 31, 2001, LEXIS, News Library. The
close proximity of Indonesia to Australia's territorial islands makes it an almost inevitable point of transit
for asylum seekers from Iraq and Afghanistan. See supra notes 3 and 7, referring to the geographical
locations of Australian territorial islands.
145 Megaphone Drowns Out Reality, AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL REV., Sept. 12, 2001, LEXIS, News
Library.
149 Trading in Misery, supra note 147. Typically, asylum seekers from Afghanistan and Iraq travel
by boat or plane to transit countries, such as Malaysia-which is one of a group of countries that offer free
visa entry to Muslims--or Indonesia. Id. Asylum seekers then board Indonesian fishing boats for passage
to Australia. Id.
1so Boat Heading This Way, supra note 18. Indonesians referred to Australia's treatment during the
months of August to October 2001 as "megaphone diplomacy." Howard Starts to Heal Wounds in Jakarta
Visit, AUSTRALiAN, Feb. 8, 2002, LEXIS, News Library. In an attempt to improve Australia-Indonesia
relations Prime Minister Howard offered five police boats in early February 2002 to help Indonesia combat
people smuggling. Id.
Boat Heading This Way, supra note 18.
52 Fact Sheet 60, supra note 101; CROCK, supra note 28, at 124.
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country,' 53 this system does not cater to the people who are in the greatest
need of immediate resettlement.' 54  Asylum seekers who turn to people
smugglers are conveyed to Australia in a matter of a few days, while the
wait in line for an Offshore resettlement grant in Australia is over one year
long.'55 Desperate victims cannot afford to wait in the queue for legal
refugee status, 156 and thus they attempt sea voyage to Australia to claim
Onshore protection. Consequently, the journey to Australia for an illegal
migrant is usually facilitated by people smugglers who operate out of
Indonesia. 157
People smugglers are not only a problem for Australia, but also
constitute an international dilemma,158 earning nearly USD 20 billion in
profits annually. 59 Some Tampa asylum seekers disclosed that they had
paid USD 16,000 to the people smugglers operating out of Indonesia for
passage to Australia.' 60  While concerned with people smuggling because it
is a dangerous method of travel for asylum seekers to engage in and because
it undermines the public faith in the asylum system, the UNHCR refuses to
become a crime control body.' 61 Thus, States Parties are left to devise their
own methods for controlling people smuggling networks. 162
'" CROCK, supra note 28, at 124.
1 Id. at 125.
135 See Sanctuary Under Review, supra note 98, at 252.
156 The "queue" refers to the wait for a protection visa through the Offshore Resettlement Program.
Corlett, supra note 104, at 17-18. "This perception is based on the erroneous notion that there is a well-
organised international refugee queue." Id. at 17. "A more appropriate metaphor to that of a 'refugee
queue' might be that of a 'refugee heap' out of which very few are plucked for resettlement in countries
such as Australia." Id. at 18.
157 Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Australian Immigration
Fact Sheet 73: People Smuggling, at http://www.immi.gov.au/facts/73smuggling.htm (last modified Nov.
16, 2001); see also Esmaeili & Wells, supra note I, at 224.
1s8 See, e.g., Nuala Haughey, Asylum-Seekers Find First World Hard to Get To, IRISH TIMEs, Dec.
10, 2001, LEXIS, News Library (stating that "an estimated seven million illegal immigrants are brought to
Europe every year by smugglers"); Refugee Protection, supra note 12, at 3 ("It is now commonly agreed
among governments and international agencies that a muli-faceted approach is the only response with any
hope of success in combating trafficking, i.e., with any prospect of matching the sophistication and multi-
nationality of the trafficking networks."); see also GLOBAL HuMAN SMUGGLING: COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES (David Kyle & Rey Koslowski eds., 2001).
"9 Glenn Mitchell & Jim Dickins, Trading in Tragedy, HERALD SUN, Oct. 27, 2001, LEXIS, News
Library, Major World Newspapers.
160 Christopher Niesche & Megan Saunders, Safe at Last: First of the Tampa Refugees Find a Home,
AUSTRALtAN, Dec. 13, 2001, LEXIS, News Library.
161 Refugee Protection, supra note 12, at 7.
162 But see Note on International Protection, U.N. GAOR Exec. Comm. of the High Commissioner's
Programme, 52d sess., U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/951 (Sept. 13, 2001), http://www.unhcr.ch. Two protocols on
smuggling and trafficking to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,
opened for signature in December 2000: the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and
Air; and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children. Id. at 4-5. Moreover, thirty-seven nations participated in a people smuggling conference in Bali,
hosted by Australia and Indonesia, at the end of February 2002. Modest Progress on People Smuggling,
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As the influx of asylum seekers from new source countries increases,
States Parties feel uncomfortable about where to draw the asylum line.
Australia's Immigration Minister has expressed a fear of seeming "soft" and
aims to make Australia less attractive for boat migrants by tightening the
laws under which illegal migrants are processed. 163 Although scholars in the
field argue that the Refugee Convention regime is "incomplete" and "ill
suited" to address modem-day refugee migration patterns,' 64  few
suggestions have been made on how to reopen the Refugee Convention
without ultimately eviscerating the rights that currently exist for refugees.
165
C. Boat People Deterrence: 2001 Border Control Legislation
On September 26, 2001, the Australian Parliament passed border
control legislation to deter people smugglers and fortify Australia's
coastline. 166 The swift passage of this new legislation immediately followed
the Federal Full Court decision in Ruddock v. Vardarlis that the Tampa
asylum seekers were not illegally detained on board, 167 and was intended to
legislatively justify the Federal Government's detainment of asylum seekers
on board the Tampa if the case went on appeal to the High Court.'
68
In Vardarlis v. Ruddock,169 civil liberties lawyers-including the
Victorian Council of Civil Liberties and independent solicitor Eric
AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL REV., Mar. 2, 2002, LEXIS, News Library. Working groups were established at
the conference and are expected to report back in one year's time. Id.
'63 Ian Henderson, Ugly Politics in Tragedy's Wake, AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 24, 2001, LEXIS, News
Libr164 See Revitalizing, supra note 121, at 229-31 (acknowledging that some scholars have this view);
Sanctuary Under Review, supra note 98, at 252 (acknowledging that the Refugee Convention is ill-
equipped to deal with the reality of modem refugee flows). See also No Shame in Putting National Interest
First, supra note 6 (quoting the Australia Day message of Harry Gibbs, former Chief Justice of the
Australian High Court: "[T]he convention needs to be rewritten or entirely abrogated as being ill suited to
the conditions of today.").
165 See Revitalizing, supra note 121, at 235 ("[W]hatever its inadequacies, the Refugee Convention
should not be abandoned until the international community is prepared, as it was in 1951 and 1967, to
assume new binding legal commitments to protect forced migrants.").
'66 Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act, 2001 (Austl.); Migration
Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act, 2001 (Austl.); Migration Amendment (Excision from
Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Act, 2001 (Austl.); Migration Legislation Amendment Act,
No. 1, 2001 (Austl.); Migration Legislation Amendment Act, No. 5, 2001 (Austl.); Migration Legislation
Amendment Act, No. 6, 2001 (Austl.); and, Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act, 2001
(Austl.).
167 Ruddock v. Vardarlis, 183 A.L.R. 1 (Sept. 18, 2001).
16' The Australian Constitution provides that the judicial power of the Commonwealth of Australia is
vested in a Federal Supreme Court, called the High Court of Australia. Commonwealth of Australia
Constitution Act, § 71 (Austl.), http://scaleplus.law.gov.au (last visited Mar. 5, 2002).
169 Vardarlis v. Ruddock, 64 A.L.D. 67 (Sept. 11, 2001), overruled by Ruddock v. Vardarlis, 183
A.L.R. 1 (Sept. 18, 2001).
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Vardarlis-filed an action in Australian Federal Court on behalf of the
Tampa asylum seekers, arguing that the Federal Government had acted
unconstitutionally by detaining the asylum seekers on board.' 70  Vardarlis
first prevailed in Federal Court, but later lost on the Federal Government's
appeal to the Full Court, where the majority held that the asylum seekers
were not detained and that the Federal Government had acted within its
constitutionally-granted executive power by taking steps to prevent the
landing of the migrants.
17
'
The Australian Government feared the High Court would reverse if
the Full Court decision was considered on appeal. Thus, in an attempt to
bolster its case, the Liberal Party pushed retroactive legislation through
Parliament one week later to, among other provisions, formally excise the
external territories from Australia's migration zones 172 and demanded
attorney and court fees from the defeated Civil Liberties lawyers. 173  A
summary of important provisions of the acts passed on September 26, 2001
follows: 174
(1) Ashmore, Cartier, Christmas, and Cocos Islands were removed
from Australia's migration zone, effectively excising these
territories from Australia for migration purposes; thus, those who
illegally arrive at these islands may be taken to a declared country
and can no longer apply for a visa to Australia, unless the Minister
determines otherwise for the benefit of the public interest. 75
(2) A new visa system was established where the type of visa granted
depends upon whether the asylum seeker landed at an excised
territory and whether the asylum seeker traveled through one or
more safe countries where she could have stayed without fear of
persecution:
170 Id.
171 Ruddock v. Vardarlis, 183 A.L.R. 1 (Sept. 18, 2001).
'72 Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act, 2001 (Austl.); Migration
Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act, 2001 (Austl.); Migration Amendment (Excision from
Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Act, 2001 (Austl.); Migration Legislation Amendment Act,
No. 1, 2001 (Austl.); Migration Legislation Amendment Act, No. 5, 2001 (Austl.); Migration Legislation
Amendment Act, No. 6, 2001 (Austl.); and, Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act, 2001
(Austl.).
173 Ruddock v. Vardarlis, 2001 F.C.A. 1865, 2001 AUST FEDCT LEXIS 2122 (Dec. 21, 2001). Eric
Vardarlis, attorney for the Tampa asylum seekers, claimed a victory after a court ruled that the Government
would bear its own costs of AUD 200,000 in attorney and court fees. Id.; Navy turns boat back to
Indonesia, supra note 22.
174 Phillip Ruddock, Information on New Border Control Legislation, at http://minister.immi.gov.au/
mediaOl/rO 1177 inform.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2001).
175 Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act 2001.
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(a) an asylum seeker who arrives at an excised territorial islands
will only qualify to apply for a three-year temporary
Secondary Movement Offshore Entry visa; and
(b) an asylum seeker who spends more than seven days in
another safe country en route to Australia, but who is not an
Offshore Entry person, may apply for a five year temporary
Secondary Movement Relocation visa. The Secondary
Movement Relocation visa-holder may apply for a
permanent visa after four and a half years, and his family
can only join him after he successfully obtains a permanent
visa.
1 6
(3) People smugglers will now be sentenced to a minimum of five
and a maximum of twenty years in prison for a first conviction
and a minimum of eight and a maximum of twenty years for a
second conviction. The new laws further enhance Australian
authorities' existing powers to board boats carrying illegal
travelers, search the boat, detain the passengers, and remove them
from the boat. Court challenges to these actions are not
allowed. 1
77
(4) Media attention solicited by the asylum seeker which effectively
put him or her at risk in the country of origin will be disregarded
in the determination of refugee status. 
178
(5) Adverse inferences will be drawn if people refuse to provide
documents to prove their nationality and do not have an
acceptable explanation for the missing documents or if the person
refuses to provide information on oath or affirmation.
179
(6) Australian courts will be required to adhere to and not expand
beyond the definition of a refugee as stated in the Refugee
Convention and Protocol. 80
(7) Illegal migrants may not challenge a visa rejection, except on very
limited grounds, and no class action law suits are allowed.'
8
'
176 Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions), 2001.
77 Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act, 2001.
78 Migration Legislation Amendment Act, No. 6, 2001.
79 id.
180 Id.
'8' Migration Legislation Amendment Act, No. 1, 2001; Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial
Review) Act, 2001.
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V. THE CHALLENGE: To RECONCILE THE 1951 IDEALS WITH CURRENT
REFUGEE ISSUES
A. Australia's New Border Control Amendments Contravene
International Law
After the 2001 amendments, Australia fails to comply with important
obligations of the Refugee Convention. While the United States failed to
meet Article 33 obligations when Haitian asylum seekers were returned
without asylum screening, Australia most notably fails to meet Article 31
obligations by penalizing asylum seekers who arrive illegally by boat.
182
The Australian system had already been criticized for its two-tiered visa
protection plan, which prefers those who apply for refugee determination
from overseas over unauthorized arrivals, who are portrayed as illegal
refugees, abusers of the generous refugee system, threats to the Australian
community, and "queue jumpers."' 8 3 In light of the 2001 Border Control
Amendments, Australia not only continues to discriminate between legal and
illegal refugees, but automatically penalizes and repels all asylum seekers
who arrive by boat.
Australia may also contravene Article 32 of the Refugee Convention
by eliminating due process for asylum seekers who arrive at territorial
islands. Even though the asylum seekers were processed for refugee
determination by UNHCR at Nauru and other locations, they were expelled
from Australian territory without due process of law as required by Article
32. Australia's new interpretation of the word "territory" exscinds territorial
islands from migration territory, while the UNHCR asserts that international
obligations apply "whenever a state acts," regardless of whether in territorial
or extraterritorial waters.' 84 If a boat migrant transported to Nauru proves
not to be a refugee, then there is no breach of the Refugee Convention.
However, with this new legislation, Australia erroneously assumes that all
boat people will prove not to be refugees.
182 Ironically, the applicability of the Refugee Convention's Article 31 was not considered by the
Australian Federal Court in Ruddock v. Vardarlis. 183 A.L.R. 1 (Sept. 18, 2001). GOODWIN-GILL, supra
note 40, at 24. Furthermore, temporary protection schemes, such as Australia's TPV, seem to contravene
the Refugee Convention's Article 33 obligation of nonrefoulement, because refugees, though not
immediately returned, are eventually returned to their country of origin. Esmaeili & Wells, supra note 1, at
238-240; for a discussion of the Refugee Convention's Article 33, see supra note 60 and accompanying
text. The TPV scheme not only fails to correspond with the three solutions advocated by the UNHCR, but
keeps the refugees in limbo with the possibility of return to the country of origin after the visa expires and
thus unable to rebuild a normal, permanent life.
183 Corlett, supra note 104, at 13-14.
184 UNHCR Brief, supra note 94.
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Most boat people who arrive on Australian soil are refugees; statistics
show that at least two-thirds of the Afghan and Iraqi boat migrants processed
in Australia in 1999 were granted refugee status as valid asylum seekers
fleeing war or persecution.' 85  Since the Tampa incident, 130 out of 131
asylum seekers sent to New Zealand were granted refugee status and
resettlement there. 1 6  Other refugees at Nauru, Papua New Guinea, and
Indonesia must also be resettled unless they choose voluntary repatriation
based on the changed circumstances in Afghanistan.18 7
B. Australia's Response to Boat People is Not Sustainable Legal Policy
Not only illegal in light of international obligations, Australia's
disproportionately harsh migration laws pertaining to boat people are both
unsustainable and economically infeasible. Australia's new policy relies on
the cooperation of third-party developing nations that have little to no
infrastructure to accommodate refugees. 18 The Pacific Solution,18 9 which
enables Australia to send unauthorized arrivals who are intercepted at an
excised territorial island or at sea to be taken to a "declared country," such as
Nauru, Papua New Guinea, and other island states of the Pacific, is
unsustainable because developing nations will soon grow weary of the
asylum processing camp role.190 In some cases, island states such as New
Zealand might take asylum seekers merely for philanthropic reasons.
199
However, most nations rarely find third countries willing to take refugees off
their hands. For example, Australia had to bribe Nauru and Papua New
Guinea into taking asylum seekers, 92 and Fiji refused to accept 1000 asylum
seekers that Australia asked them to house for processing in return for
money.
93
185 Many Iraqis, Afghans Win Sanctuary, AGE, Jan. 17, 2000, LEXIS, News Library, Major World
Newspapers; see also Corlett, supra note 104, at 17.
86 See Afghans Find Hope in NZ, supra note 132.
187 Although the Taliban no longer governs Afghanistan, the U.N. warned that the humanitarian crisis
was worsening as refugees returning home from Pakistan placed further strains on food and other aid.
Crosweller & Saunders, supra note 140.
'88 Nauru and Papua New Guinea were not prepared to accommodate asylum seekers, but accepted
Australia-bound asylum seekers in return for money and infrastructure aid. See sources cited supra note 6.
189 Garran & Saunders, supra note 6.
190 Lindsay Murdoch, Nauru Says Canberra Must Stick to the Deal, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD,
Mar. 1, 2002, LEXIS, News Library (noting that Nauru officials are concerned that Australia might renege
on its promise to resettle refugees who are housed at Nauru by the end of May).
I See Ring of Misery Around Region, supra note 6.
192 See sources cited supra note 6.
193 Mary Louise O'Callaghan & Megan Saunders, Fiji Refusal Casts Cloud Over Pacific Solution,
AUsTRALIAN, Nov. 23, 2001, LEXIS, News Library.
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Moreover, the interception program is not an economically feasible
long-term solution for Australia. The Pacific Solution to date has been
estimated to cost the Australian Government AUD 482 million for the 2001-
02 fiscal year,' 94 while the Government originally allocated only AUD 250
million to process unauthorized arrival for the 2001-02 year. 95 Thus far, the
distant asylum processing system has been an expensive solution for
Australia-and since the so-called "declared countries" have little to no
infrastructure to support sustainable refugee processing camps, there is no
end in sight.
VI. CONCLUSION
Australia was asked to absorb large numbers of asylum seekers who
arrived unexpectedly and without valid travel documentation from new
source countries, Iraq and Afghanistan. Australia responded to this great
influx of boat migrants by excising its territorial islands from its migration
zone, thereby categorically penalizing all asylum seekers who arrive in mass
flux situations by turning away boats. This solution not only defies
Australia's international obligations to refugees, but it is an unsustainable
and economically infeasible legal policy as well. If tolerated, it will fuel the
deterrence machine that already grinds away at the spirit of the international
refugee protection regime, eventually obliterating all refugee rights. In order
to salvage an international system for refugee protection, contemporary
policy-makers at the national level must reconcile the obligations and ideals
of the 1951 Refugee Convention with today's migration issues.
"' Costello Forced to Find $400M as Refugee Costs Spiral, supra note 16. The 2001-02 Australian
Federal Government Budget originally allocated AUD 250 million for processing unauthorized boat
arrivals. Id. This was boosted by a further AUD 147 million in the mid-year review in December and an
additional AUD 85 million in February. Id.
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